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Introduction
Over the last decade a discursive social psychological approach has been developed in parallel to more established social psychological perspectives. Discursive social psychology (henceforth DSP) is the application of ideas from discourse analysis to issues in social psychology. Its publication record stretches back through the 80s where empirical, theoretical and conceptual arguments were developed in both discourse and rhetoric research (e.g. Billig, 1985; Billig, 1996 Billig, [1987 ; Litton and Potter, 1985; Potter and Wetherell, 1987) . Since then these strands of work have largely merged together, drawing on work in conversation analysis (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1992) , and tackling topics in both social and cognitive psychology (Antaki, 1994; Edwards, 1991 Edwards, , 1997 Potter, 1992, 1993; Potter & Edwards, forthcoming; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) .
In this paper we will push this argument forward using the topic of attitudes and opinions. This is a topic that has marked out DSP from social cognition and other traditional approaches. DSP has provided both a critique of tradition conceptualizations of attitudes (Billig, 1996 (Billig, [1987 (Billig, ], 1988 (Billig, , 1989 Burningham, 1995; Wetherell, 1987, 1988; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Wetherell, et al., 1987) and a respecification in terms of evaluative practices and orientations (Potter, 1998; Myers, 1998; Verkuyten, 1998) .
Put simply, DSP studies documenting both the variation and rhetorical organization of evaluations present problems for social cognition and other traditional accounts of attitudes; while studies of the pragmatics of evaluations suggest new ways of understanding their role in people's practices.
Such DSP studies, however, throw up a paradox. How can they be reconciled with the wide range of research that both presupposes and finds evidence of enduring underlying attitudes? After all, attitudes continue to figure in a very large number of social psychological studies and continue to be viewed as one of its most indispensable concepts (Manstead, 1995) . One possible way of making sense of this paradox is to consider the connection of method and theory. Could the sorts of methods of attitude research that have been used restrict the appearance of evaluative variation and exclude evidence of the rhetorical organization of evaluations? Arguments of this kind have been made with respect to Likert scales and other quantitative measurement techniques Potter, 1998; Potter and Wetherell, 1987) .
In this study we consider an area of psychological research where qualitative studies of attitudes are commonplace, namely market research. In particular, we will consider the use of focus groups that are now widely used as a way of 'eliciting' people's opinions, attitudes and beliefs about products, policies and services. Our interest will be in the way evaluations are treated, and particularly how they are produced as 'freestanding opinion packages'. That is, how they are treated as bundled packets that can be listed, counted, and passed from one to another.
Focus groups are structured around an interactional dilemma (Puchta, 1999; Puchta and Potter, 1999; cf. Billig et al., 1988) . On the one hand, focus group participants are asked to 'always say,=whatever comes to mind' (see extract above). On the other, participants seem to be carefully policed into 'what exactly comes to mind'. In this study we will investigate the procedures that focus group moderators use for discovering the traditional notion of opinion within participants, while overtly eliciting it from them.
The Discursive Psychology of Evaluation
In traditional social psychology attitudes are treated as having a number of core features. They are: example, studies discussed in Eagly and Chaiken, 1993 ).
Elsewhere we have discussed some of these theoretical complications (e.g. Potter, 1998) . However, our concern in this paper is with the broad sweep of social psychological research, including research done in marketing contexts, that uses attitude measures without necessarily being concerned with potential theoretical nuances and respecifications. We take it that most readers will recognise the core features listed above as characteristic of studies that apply attitude notions to particular topics. This traditional notion has been reworked from a discourse and rhetorical perspective. The rhetorical nature of attitudes is stressed by Billig (1988 Billig ( , 1989 Billig ( , 1991 Billig ( , 1992 who claims that, rather than carry attitudes around as fixed entities, people:
 give views in particular contexts;  produce evaluations where there is at least the possibility of argument (they tend not to argue about the virtues of gravitational force);  while expressing an evaluation for something, and marking the justification of their own position, often simultaneously express criticisms against the counterposition.
Whereas Billig stresses that attitudes are rhetorically occasioned and are therefore inextricable from the arguments in which they occur, Potter, 1998) have drawn attention to what people are doing by making evaluations (or displaying a lack of evaluation) in particular settings. Both Billig and Potter & Wetherell highlight variations in evaluations as evidence critical of traditional research. The point is here that evaluations are not treated as ready-made cognitive objects, but as entities that are worked up by the participants in ways that are suitable for what is being done (compliments and complaints, persuading people against courses of action, and so on).
In this paper our interest will be in whether the conduct of focus groups will involve particular interactional practices to strip off these rhetorical and performative elements of evaluative talk. That is, we will ask whether focus group practices obscure precisely those features of evaluations that distinguish DSP and traditional approaches.
Before moving to this, however, there are some terminological issues that need to be tackled to prevent confusion. Social psychologists have sometimes distinguished the term 'attitude' from 'opinion', reserving the former for underlying evaluative positions and the latter for verbal statements of those positions. This distinction is plausible when making certain traditional assumptions, but it is not used consistently in the market research we are studying.
Moreover, even traditional researchers find it hard to sustain consistently in practice. On the one hand, for example, popular recent definitions of attitude (such as Zanna & Rempel, 1988) define attitudes as 'evaluative categorizations' (starting to blur the distinction between evaluation and action) and attitudes are anyway typically (although not always) operationalized in research studies in terms of discourse activities ('verbal responses'). On the other hand, research on people's 'opinions' is rarely concerned with verbal statements as such (how they are occasioned, what they are doing); in practice 'public opinion' is treated as an underlying variable much like attitudes are treated in social psychology (see, for example, Curtice & Jowell, 1996) .
Researchers using focus groups, and discussing focus group methodology, sometimes compound this terminological blurring by describing focus groups as concerned with POBAsan acronym that brings together a deliberately fuzzy set of notions: Perspectives, Opinions, Beliefs and Attitudes (see Puchta, 1999) . From our DSP perspective, the analytic topic is 'evaluative practices' (assessments in discourse and their various uses), so we are neither committed to the terms 'attitude' and 'opinion', nor to producing a technical demarcation between them. Our expectation is that there will be a wide variety of uses of evaluations and the available meta-language may capture some better than others.
Focus groups and interaction
Focus groups derive their results from interaction and are participant centred. This is emphasised in the various books that are available giving guidance on the proper conduct of focus groups (e.g. Krueger, 1998; Morgan, 1997) . It is also typically emphasised by the group moderator (the researcher who is present and guides and oversees the group).
For example, this extract is taken from the moderator's introductory remarks at the start of a focus group:
It would be nice, (.) ((clears her throat)) all in all, (1.0) if we could have a >so-called< group-discussion, if we could really get into a discussion,=and I don't want to interrogate,=and I certainly don't want to test you, (.) and it's not about knowledge, but about opinions, >you just always say,=whatever comes to mind, (.) and there are< no, (.) right or wrong answers.
Note the way the contrast is built between knowledge and opinion, and how participants are encouraged to avoid treating answers as right or wrong.
The relationship between interaction and the 'results' of market focus groups is quite complex. The companies who commission the group (in this case typically concerned with extending the line of a particular brand of cigarette) pay for three kinds of output. They may have a representative who watches the interaction from behind a one-way mirror; they will be given a video of the interaction; they will be given a report of the interaction written by the moderator (which typically summarises themes and gives sample quotes of people's 'views'). None of these forms of output takes priority over the others. This means that the moderator is a central part of the data production. He or she can, for example, display the importance of something by showing attention to it or visibly ignoring it. This will be apparent to the client whether through the one-way mirror or on the video, or in what is quoted in the report. These are therefore what will focus on in this paper. And our interest will be in how such phenomena are handled methodologically. That is, how do moderators deal with the rhetorical finessing of argumentation, and in particular how, if at all, do they re-package such formulations into freestanding entities? We will also be concerned with evidence that moderators train participants that freestanding opinions are appropriate to produce in focus groups.
Conversation Analysis of institutions and social research
In this study we have drawn heavily on the theoretical assumptions and analytic perspective of Conversation Analysis.
Let us indicate how we have done this and why. One of the main assumptions of Conversation Analysis (henceforth CA) is that contributions to interaction are contextually oriented.
Heritage suggests that talk in interaction is both 'context shaped and context renewing ' (1984:242) . That is, a speaker's contribution is both designed with regard to the local configuration of activity and in particular the immediately preceding actions, and itself inevitably contributes to the framework in terms of which the next action will be understood. This is a dynamic view that considers context not as given, but as an active accomplishment. CA makes a break from conventional approaches of institutional settings that adopt a 'container' model of institutional contexts (Heritage, 1987) and instead emphasises the way participants orient to, and constitute the nature of institutional interaction (Drew and Heritage, 1992) .
Recently CA workers have started to apply this perspective to the process of social research itself. For example, Suchman and Jordan (1990) and Schaeffer and Maynard (1996) have studied interactional processes in survey interviews, Antaki and Rapley (1996; Rapley and Antaki, 1996) have studied the administration of a quality of life questionnaire, and Myers and Macnaghten (Myers, 1998; Myers and Macnaghten, 1999) has considered the management of focus group interaction. These studies identify generic organizational problems that appear in research methods such as interviews and focus groups, and study the organized solution to them (see also Schegloff, 1990) . One way of conceptualizing our current study is as a contribution to this literature on interaction in social research, which has a particular concern with the way participants manage the task of producing opinions out of interaction.
Research questions
Our research questions are stimulated by the contrast between the claims of DSP about the rhetorical and performative nature of evaluative talk and the presence of a large body of focus group market research that purports to work with and identify individual attitudes and opinions. In particular, we will address the following questions. These criteria were chosen to facilitate generalization from the findings.
Each focus group lasted for ninety minutes or more; the number of participants varied from seven to eleven. We transcribed two focus groups from beginning to end, segments of thirty minutes from six focus groups and the opening sequence from every focus group, making altogether more than six hours of transcribed talk. Further transcript was made from the video as needed. Out of six moderators in the materials four were male and two were female; this broadly reflects current employment patterns in the area. In all groups, about half of the participants were female. As participants are chosen to reflect the target group of the discussed cigarette brand, only one focus group consisted of middle-aged participants, all the others consisted of 'young' smokers -from the age of eighteen until about twenty-eight.
Transcription and translation
The focus groups were conducted in German. They were transcribed in German and these transcripts translated into English; a bilingual English speaker checked all translations.
The analysis was done on the German original, but for presentation purposes we will work primarily with the English translation. We discussed from case to case, how best to transfer pauses and characteristics of speech production such as emphasized sounds from the German original to the English translation.
All cigarette brands talked about in the groups have been pseudonomized by naming them after capital cities. 
Analytic Procedure
The materials were analysed using techniques from CA and DSP (Drew, 1995; Heritage, 1997; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; Potter, 1996 Potter, , 1997 Potter & Edwards, forthcoming; Ten Have, 1998 In the analysis we have mainly chosen to present one instance of each of the phenomena we are concerned with. This is a compromise between journal space and reader patience, on the one hand, and allowing the reader the option to assess our analysis of a range of examples, on the other (further examples and analyses are available in Puchta, 1999) . Our analysis is concerned with identifying a normative pattern rather than a general statistical association, so our analysis of potential deviant cases is particular important for supporting the adequacy of our claims.
Analysis

Rhetorical construction and moderator recipiency
Let us start with a relatively coarse grained observation about moderator recipiency. The moderators in our sample display attention (that is, visibly attend) to freestanding opinion formulations and display disattention to (explicitly) rhetorically embedded formulations. In Figure This example is a useful start-point as it illustrates the kind of phenomena of interest. However, what is going on is often more subtle than this. In the following 3 sections we will look at techniques that moderators use to head off interaction between participants with its associated rhetorical construction of evaluations and to formulate freestanding opinion packages from rhetorically organized talk.
Displaying inconsequentiality
One of the most straightforward techniques for displaying the inconsequentiality of rhetorically embedded evaluations is to ignore them. This is seen in the interaction patterns above. Let us consider an example in detail.
The following extract comes from a focus group where the participants are discussing the name for a new cigarette brand. 'Cape Blue Ultra' is the proposed name for a planned light line extender (lower tar version) of the stronger 'mother brand' 'Cape'; the Cape Blue Ultra packet is blue, the Cape packet is red.
(2) Source: Blue17,919; file: diagra1a; video: 27:11 The general point, then, is the way that the moderator encourages participants to produce freestanding opinions by ignoring opinions that are produced in discussion between participants. This displayed disattention will be available to the observer using the one-way mirror, of course, as it is on the video.
Meta requests for freestanding opinion talk
Sometimes moderators 'go meta'. That is, they provide explicit formulations of the kind of contributions that are welcome (cf. Simons, 1989 formulates very similar contributions as a freestanding opinion, and when it is addressed to the moderator, the opinion is not only accepted but also praised. The general observation here is that the moderator's intervention with a meta observation about the conduct of the participants leads to the production of a freestanding opinion package.
So far we have considered how the moderators deal with rhetorically oriented opinion production by ignoring it or making explicit injunctions against it. We will now consider another approach, which is for moderators to 'strip off' the rhetorical elements and thereby formulate freestanding opinion packages.
Stripping off the rhetorical context
Let us consider an example of stripping off rhetorical context. This is an exercise where the moderator asks which brands the participants would place near the light cigarette Near the start of the sequence P1 stresses he would categorize brands 'mechanically' according to 'labels' (lines 37-40). During P1's turn the moderator orients his attention to other participants and P2 starts to come in. However, P1
continues displaying his opinion. P2 then presents his opinion in using an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986;  Edwards, in press):
on no account next to other light products, (lines 74-6).
He constructs his argument as a counter-argument to P1
and The moderator formulates an element of P2's talk which has been used to undermine P1's argument (see Heritage, 1985 ).
What we see, then, is that the moderator picks out an argument used to support a particular position and presents it as a freestanding thing. The general point here is that when participants produce evaluative talk, which develops explicit rhetorical contrasts, these can be removed to leave the evaluations as freestanding entities tied to individuals.
In our corpus there is, however, evidence that there is a conversational environment in which the production of nonfreestanding opinion displays is tolerated, that is, attended to, and formulated as focus group relevant. In our final section we will attend to such deviant cases and consider their implications for our general claims.
Deviant cases
Up to now we have claimed that moderators in market research focus groups display a preference for individual opinions in the form of freestanding packages. They systematically ignore rhetorically developed opinions, or explicitly offer 'rules' against their use, or they formulate such opinions with their rhetorical elements stripped off.
However, there are certain occasions where agreement tokens are tolerated as rhetorically formulated contributions. These are particularly interesting as potential cases which might raise problems for the sorts of pattern we have identified, or which allow us to refine our claims. In this section we will look more closely at the environment in which such sequences are embedded.
The following extract revolves around discussion of the 'typical smoker' of Cape Blue Ultras. The moderator is following up on a participant's description, asking her whether the 'typical smoker' is a man or a woman. Let us highlight two features of this sequence. First, the question is unusual in asking for a number of some kind ('how long') rather than for a qualitative opinion. Second, the answers are organized contrastively (three or four cigarettes vs. two pulls vs. don't know). Although this is not quite as simple as the previous case, the continuum is chunked into three categories. It is these categorical claims that receive the unqualified agreements and disagreements.
The general point, then, is that there is an environment in these market research focus groups where agreement and disagreement tokens are treated as acceptable. This environment is one where the participants are offering categorical judgements, or judgements on a numerical continuum, rather than qualitative opinions.
Discussion
Let us summarise the main points of our analysis before discussing some more general issues to do with focus group practice and the discursive social psychology of attitudes. We have tried to show the way freestanding individual opinion packages are produced in focus groups. That is, although evaluative talk is recurrently produced in the form of rhetorical contrasts and agreement/disagreement tokens, the moderator deals with this kind of talk in three particular ways.
 First, and most simply, it is ignored (Sections 1 & 2).
 Second, various occasioned meta rules or injunctions are developed to support the production of freestanding opinion packages (Section 3).
 Third, when moderators formulate opinion packages out of sequences where participants produce them rhetorically and contrastively, these rhetorical elements are stripped off to leave freestanding opinion packages (Section 4).
Finally, we considered deviant cases. The only examples that fell outside the three management techniques where those where participants were offering categorical judgements.
We have concentrated here specifically on the individuation of evaluative talk into personal opinion packages. However, elsewhere we have considered the way in which moderators generate 'opinion talk' rather than 'factual talk', as well as the use of 'repeat receipts' as a common device for stripping off rhetorical orientations (Puchta, 1999; Puchta & Potter, forthcoming) .
With respect to the practice of focus groups, the production of individual and freestanding opinions is typically what is required. For example, one of the most popular manuals on the conduct and analysis of focus groups describes three different models of report writing:
The first style of presentation consists of the question or idea and is followed by all participant comments (the raw data model). The second style is a summary description followed by illustrative quotes (the description model). The third style is a summary description with illustrative quotes followed by an interpretation (the interpretative model). (Krueger, 1994: 167, emphasis added)
Krueger gives examples of 'illustrative quotes' for a focus group on the topic what parents look for in youth organizations:
The person in charge must be a good influence because children idolize their leaders.
Leaders are the most important thing in a youth organization. I don't want a crank for a leader. >Well I'll stick to it.< I think it's a bit aromatic.
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What we have observed in our materials, then, is in line with the 'good practice' formulated by Krueger.
We do not wish to criticise this practice here; in some ways it seems to be well suited to the goals of market research. We can speculate that such freestanding opinion packages are relatively easy to understand for the audience watching the group, and relatively easy to draw market-related conclusions from. Furthermore, they provide relatively straightforward raw material for the moderator to write up.
Colourful descriptive evaluations can be tied to individual participants and the scope of agreement/disagreement tokens does not have to be determined. This may provide a simpler basis on which to make practical recommendations.
What we have revealed are the detailed interactional procedures through which these opinion packages are produced.
It may be that an alternative moderating and analytic practice that highlights rather than obscures the rhetorical organization of evaluations would be a basis for different or even improved recommendations. However, we have no evidence either way on this issue. Moreover, it would be a particularly difficult issue to resolve: for what neutral method would be used to assess the impact of these different methodological practices? Luckily this is, anyway, not our primary concern in this paper.
Our broader concern is with the nature of opinions and attitudes and their conceptualization in social psychology.
We started with the puzzle that traditional attitude research tends to discover enduring underlying attitudes without being troubled by the kinds of variability and rhetorical organization highlighted in DSP. Our proposed methodological answer to this puzzle is that attitude measurement procedures have features that obscure these features. The example of market research focus groups illustrates one way in which this can happen.
This evidence does not directly undermine traditional conceptualizations of attitudes in favour of the DSP approach to evaluative practices. Nor does it criticise recent developments in attitude theory. That is not its point.
Rather it counters the argument that the DSP approach cannot be true because various kinds of traditional attitude research work. It illustrates one way in which such work may miss the phenomena highlighted by DSP. And it complements arguments about the way quantitative attitude measures may miss such phenomena for different reasons Potter, 1998; Potter and Wetherell, 1987) .
To end with we would like to offer two more general points. First, it is undoubtedly the case that the reconstruction of rhetorically embedded evaluations into freestanding opinion packages is not restricted to focus groups. Our guess is that it is a feature of a range of everyday and institutional practices. One of the aims of a discursive social psychology of evaluation will be to study these practices and highlight both their generic and specific features.
Second, and more speculatively, we would like to highlight a link to more sociological and historical conceptualizations of the nature of social science and its objects. One of the arguments of the philosopher and discourse analyst Michel Foucault (1972) is that the objects of social science study are constituted out of its discourse practices. Much work within the Foucaultian research tradition has taken an expansive historical perspective (e.g. Danziger, 1990; Rose, 1989) . In this case we have shown how the practices of focus group moderation can constitute freestanding opinion packages as social science objects.
